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Authors and Exploitations in International Private
Law: The French Supreme Court and the Huston
Film Colorization Controversy
by Jane C. Ginsburg* and Pierre Sirinelli**

INTRODUCTION
On May 28, 1991, France's Supreme Court, the Cour de cassation,
rendered its long-awaited decision in Huston v. la Cinq,' a controversy
that opposed the heirs of film director John Huston against the
French television station Channel 5 and its licensor, Turner Entertainment. Defendants sought to broadcast a colorized version of
Huston's black and white film classic, The Asphalt Jungle. Plaintiffs,
John Huston's children and Ben Maddow, who collaborated with
Huston on the film's screenplay, asserted that broadcast of a
colorized version violated Huston's and Maddow's moral right of integrity in the motion picture. The central question before the Cour
de cassation, however, concerned not the substance of the integrity
claim, but plaintiffs' entitlement to invoke it.
Under French law, the moral right to preserve a work's artistic integrity is an incident of authorship. Upon creating the work, authors
are invested with exclusive moral and economic rights.2 While economic rights may be transferred, moral rights are both inalienable
and perpetual.' Thus, a film director who has granted all economic
interests in her work nonetheless retains the moral rights to oppose
violations of the work's integrity and to receive authorship credit for
her work. Under U.S. law, by contrast, film directors do not enjoy
rights tantamount to, or even approaching, their French counter* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. Research for this article was supported in part by the Columbia University School of Law Summer Research Grants program.
** Professor of Law, University of Paris XI.
Copyright © 1991 by Jane C. Ginsburg and Pierre Sirinelli
1. Judgment of May 28, 1991, Cass. civ. Ire, 1991 La Semaine Juridique (Juris-Classeur
Periodique) U.C.P.] II 21731 note A. Franqon; 149 REVUE INTEraNATiONALE DU DRorr
D'AUTEUR [R.I.D.A.] 197 (1991). An English translation of the decision appears at the
Appendix.
2. France, Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 1.
3. Id., art. 6.
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parts. Most significantly, under U.S. copyright law's "works made for
hire" doctrine, employees, or in most circumstances, commissioned
creators who participate in the elaboration of a motion picture, are
not considered "authors": the film's producer is deemed the
"author."'
The problem in the Huston case therefore was: Who is the "author" of the film? If the French courts applied the U.S. law concept
of authorship, then John Huston would not have been ruled the "author," and accordingly, he and his heirs would lack any moral rights.
If, however, the French courts applied the French concept of authorship, then John Huston's status as an "author" would have been recognized; accordingly, he and his heirs would have been the beneficiary of the moral right of integrity. Thus, first and foremost the
Huston affair presented an international conflicts of laws controversy.
Although the lower courts, issuing preliminary relief,5 and the
Paris first-level court 6 had held for plaintiffs on a variety of grounds,7
the Paris Court of Appeals, on July 6, 1989, found for defendants.
Declining to apply Article l4bis of the Berne Convention, which
designates the competence of the law of the country where protection is sought to determine ownership rights in motion pictures, 8 the
appellate court announced a choice of law rule designating the law of
the country of the work's origin to determine copyright ownership
and authorship status. The court believed that' application of U.S.
law, under which the creative contributors to the film enjoyed no
authorship rights, did not violate strongly held French public policy.9
4. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (1978).
5. Judgment of June 24, 1988, Trib. gr. inst., Paris (r6f6r6),Judgment of June 25, 1988,
Cour d'appel, Paris (r6f6r6), 138 R.I.D.A. 309, 312 (1988) note Y. Gaubiac; 1988 JOURNAL DU
DROrr INTERNATIONAL [CLUNET] 1010, 1016 note B. Edelman; 1988 REVUE TRIMESTRIEL DE
DROIT COMMERCIAL [R.T.D. COM.] 42 obs. A. Franqon; 1988 IMAGES JURIDIQUES, No. 1, at 3
obs. P. Sirinelli.
6. Judgment of Nov. 23, 1988, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 139 R.I.D.A. 205 (1989); 1989 REVUE
CRITIQUE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PRivi [R.C.D.I.P.] 372, 378 note P.-Y. Gautier; 1989
CLUNET 67, 68 note B. Edelman; 1989 Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence[D.S. Jur.] 342, 345 note B.
Audit.
7. Judgment of July 6, 1989, Cour d'appel, Paris, 143 R.I.D.A. 329, 339 (1990) note A.
Franqon; 1990 J.C.P. II 21410 note A. Franqon; 1990 D.S. Jur. 152, 155 note B. Audit; 1989
R.C.D.I.P 706, 716 note P.-Y. Gautier; 1989 CLUNET 991, 992 note B. Edelman.
8. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention], art. 14bis(2). The Paris Court of Appeals acknowledged that the
terms of this provision fit the case before it, but contended that application of this provision
'would undermine the general purpose of the treaty to promote international commerce in
works of authorship.
9. On conflicts of laws and international copyright, see generally Paul Geller, Harmonizing
Copyright-ContractConflicts Analysis, 25 COPYRIGHT 49 (1989); Jane C. Ginsburg, Colors in Con-
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The court found that the principles of moral rights lacked paramount importance even in internal French copyright law; therefore
these principles could not command extraterritorial application.1 0 Finally, the Paris court stated that even if Huston had standing, his
moral rights were not violated, because colorization constitutes an adaptation, and, in the court's reasoning, if the work is a licensed and
well-executed adaptation, it cannot violate the moral rights of the author of the underlying work. 1
The Paris appellate decision provoked considerable discussion in
French legal journals, almost all of it negative.1 2 Commentators criticized both the court's conflicts analysis, as well as its treatment of
moral rights and their role in French jurisprudence. The Cour de
cassation has now reversed the Paris Court of Appeals on the standing question. The High Court' s has held that French law directly
governs all questions of authors' rights of integrity and attribution, 4
without inquiry into the legislative competence of foreign laws that
had significant points of attachment to the litigation. The Court has
thus stressed the international applicability of the French concepts of
authorship and of these moral rights, whatever the country of the
work's origin, the nationality or domicile of the work's creators, or
the law governing the contract between creators and grantees. The
case was then remanded to the Court of Appeals of Versailles for a
decision on the merits of the moral rights claim.1 5
The Cour de cassation's decision appears to strike a blow for artistic integrity, for the decision places in the hands of creators from all
countries the power to oppose derogatory alterations of their works
flicts: Moral Rights and the Foreign Exploitation of Colorized U.S. Motion Pictures, 36 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'y 81 (1988).
10. 143 R.I.D.A. 329, 333-37 (1990).
11.

See infra text accompanying note 74.

12. See supra note 7. See also obs. F. Pollaud-Dulian, CAHIERS DU DROIT D'AUTEUR, Dec.
1989, at 1; obs. J. Ginsburg, CAHIERS DU DRorr D'AUTEUR, Dec. 1989, at 13.
13. The Cour de cassation is also referred to as the "haute juridiction."
14. Although the Huston case concerned the moral right of integrity, the statutory provisions on which the French supreme court relied give international application to both the
right of integrity and the right of attribution. See discussion infra text at note 36.
15. Under French procedure, if the Cour de cassation reverses an appellate court's decision, the remand is almost always to an appellate court other than the one sustaining the
reversal. See generally Ren6 David, French Law (1972), excerpted in COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 257, 271 (John Merryman & David Clark
eds., 1978).
American readers may be surprised at the Cour de cassation's failure to discuss the merits,
particularly in light of the Paris court's statement that even if Huston did have standing, the
substance of his moral rights claim failed. However, at the conclusion of its decision, the
High Court ruled that it was annulling the Paris court's decision "in all respects."
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in France, even when these persons are not considered "authors" in
their home countries or in the countries of the works' origin. As a
matter of conflict of laws, however, the Court's analysis is problem-

atic in its insistence upon a highly extrusive application of French law
concepts of authorship. This article will first examine the Court's
choice of law discussion. It will review traditional French conflicts
analysis in order to demonstrate some peculiarities about the Huston
decision. The significance of the decision may be gauged in part by
the extent to which the High Court departed from conventional
French conflicts analysis in favor of a direct application of French
law. The article will next consider the scope of the decision, particularly from the point of view of Huston's impact on U.S. creators and
exploiters. Finally, the article will endeavor to evaluate in some detail
the circumstances under which a U.S. contributor to a work made for
hire may now claim authorship status and enforce her moral rights in
France.
I.

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS REGARDING
AUTHORSHIP STATUS
A.

METHODOLOGY

In general, when a French court encounters a case presenting extraterritorial elements, the judges determine the law competent to
govern the claim by applying the traditional conflicts method. This
method entails determining which of the potentially pertinent laws
(French or foreign) applies to the problem posed. The choice among
the laws of countries presenting a point of attachment to the claim
follows from objective reasoning. The court characterizes the claim
as, for example, one in tort, or contract, or real property, and then
applies the choice of law rule corresponding to the claim thus characterized. For example, the choice of law rule pertaining to a real property claim designates the application of the law of the situs of the
property.16 The choice of law rule is thus, in theory, abstract, neutral, bilateral and devoid of nationalism." The issues-oriented ap16.

See generally 1

HENRI BATIFFOL & PAUL LAGARDE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRivA 7 280
DOMINIQUE HOLLEAUX ET AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVf 7 336 (1987). '
HoLLEAux ET AL, supra note 16, 1 288-94; PIERRE MAYER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL

(7th ed. 1981);
17.

PRiv V1115 (3d ed. 1987); Yvon Loussouarn, La Regle de conflit est elle une regle neutre?, 1980-

81

TRAVAUX

DU CoMITf FRANrAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV9

II 43. The conflicts ap-

proach here described resembles that set forth in the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS

(1934).
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proach that dominates much of the thinking (if not the actual judicial
decisions) in the United States " has not made much headway in
French choice of law reasoning. 9
Because the initial designation of the applicable law is, at least in
theory, made without regard to the forum's public policy, application
of the chosen foreign law may lead to a result that the French forum
finds wholly unpalatable. When the forum's "ordre public" is gravely
affronted, the forum may refuse to apply the foreign law and will
substitute its own substantive rule. This "eviction" of the normally
competent foreign law is in principle exceptional, but it allows for
preservation of strongly held local policy within a "neutral" choice of
law system. 0 The "ordre public" or public policy escape device from
the choice of law rule is not unique to French conflicts analysis; the
traditional U.S. approach to conflicts also enabled courts to decline
or of bad example or against public
to apply a foreign law "injurious
21
morality.1
policy or against
Alternatively, a French court seeking to enforce a particularly
strong local policy might simply forego any choice of law analysis and
directly apply French law. Local laws that French courts apply in lieu
of conflicts analysis are called "laws of immediate application" or
"lois de police." To rise to the level of a "loi de police," and thus
govern all transactions presenting a point of attachment with France,
regardless of the nationality or domicile of the parties, the local law
must be one "whose application is necessary for the nation's political,
social, and economic organization . . ."" The standard is vague,
but greater precision may be impossible. As two of the leading
French conflicts scholars have explained, a law of immediate application "concerns matters in which the social interests at issue seem so
important that the forum's law must apply according to its own
".

18. See articles contained in Symposium: Conflicts of Law, 34 MERCER L. REV. 501-808
(1983), especially Herma Hill Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER
L. REv. 521 (1983).
147 (3d
19. See, e.g., YVON LOUSSOUARN & PIERRE BOUREL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV"
ed. 1989) (arguing that the conflicts method espoused by many in the United States - which
the authors label "juridical impressionism" - is ill-adapted to civil law reasoning).
205-20, especially 206 for an enumeration
20. See generally MAYER, supra note 17,
of the functions and goals of the "ordre public" exception, including the preservation of
certain local legislative policies. See also HoLLEAux Er AL., supra note 16, 1 585-95.
21. Joseph Henry Beale, Summary of the Conflict of Laws in PERSPECTIVES ON CONFLICT OF
LAWS: CHOICE OF LAW 2, 6 § 49 (James A. Martin ed., 1980). See generally EUGENE SCOLES &
PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 72-75 (1982).
22. Phocion Francescakis, Conflits de lois, in 137 DALLOZ REPERTOIRE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1968) (quoted in MAYER, supra note 17, 1 122).

140

COLUMBIA-VLA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[Vol. 15:135

terms; it is a question of degree."' 8 The invocation of the "loi de
police" is nonetheless exceptional; in most litigations presenting foreign points of attachment, the French judge will follow the traditional conflicts method."'
In conflicts of copyright law, international treaties often supply the
applicable choice of law rule. 5 When the treaties furnish no rule,
French copyright conflicts analysis resorts to the traditional conflicts
method. While commentators have differed regarding what the content of the choice of law rules should be, general agreement exists
that copyright claims presenting extraterritorial aspects call for
choice of law analysis.2 6 In Huston, however, the Cour de cassation
seems to have disregarded choice of law as a touchstone for determining authorship status and entitlement to attendant rights. Rather
than inquiring into the competence of foreign laws presenting points
of attachment with the litigation, the High Court appears to have
opted for the immediate application of French law.
The Court based its ruling on two French statutory provisions.
The first, a disposition of the 1964 law on reciprocity in international
copyright, denies copyright protection to works from countries that
do not protect French copyrights, but nonetheless ensures protection
of moral rights in works from these countries.2 7 The Court interpreted this disposition to mean that "in France, no violation may be
made of the integrity of a literary or artistic work, whatever the territory on which the work was first disclosed." The second provision,
Article 6 of the 1957 copyright law, grants authors the moral rights
of attribution and integrity.28 According to the Court, "the person
who is the author of the work from the sole fact of the work's creation is invested with moral rights which are established for his benefit." The Court held that the author-protective rules set forth in
23. BATIFFOL & LAGARDE, supra note 16, 251, at 299. See, e.g., HOLLEAUX ET AL, supra
note 16, 653 (aid to endangered minors; certain spousal obligations; certain imperative protections of employees; labor bargaining representation; consumer protection measures);
MAYER, supra note 17,
124-25 (adds rules of free and fair competition to the list of "lois de
police").
24. For a fuller discussion, in English, of laws of immediate application, see Friedrich K.
Juenger, General Course on Private InternationalLaw in 193 RECUEIL DES COURs 201-02 (1985IV).
25. See, e.g., Berne Convention, art. 5.2 ("[T]he extent of protection, as well as the means
of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the
laws of the country where protection is claimed.").
26. See generally JACQUES RAYNARD, DRorr D'AUTEUR ET CONFLrT DE LoIs (1990).
27. France, Law of July 8, 1964, art. 1, cl. 2.
28. France, Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 6.
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these texts are "laws of imperative application" in France, whatever
the work's country of origin.
Thus, in France, the "author" of a foreign work is the person
French law would deem the author, whatever her status at home. Indeed, if the French law definition of authorship is now a "loi de police,"'" then a French court need not even inquire into the content of
the authorship law in the country of origin. The Court's technique
gives no recognition whatever to the international dimension of the
litigation. This juridical imperialism is all the more debatable because
the Court's abandonment of the traditional conflicts method was not
necessary in order to obtain a moral rights-sensitive result. Recognition of Huston's standing to claim moral rights could have followed
from application of a choice of law approach. Most significantly, the
Court could have followed the choice of law rule set forth in the
Berne Convention. 0 Alternatively, the Court could have acknowledged that the normally competent law was U.S. law, but could have
declined to apply U.S. law in this instance because the result of depriving the director and screenwriter of their claim to protect the
film's integrity would have violated strongly held French public policy. Indeed, the Court could have justified application of the public
policy exception by relying on the same considerations it stressed in
directly applying French law.
Despite the identical result, the difference in methodology is important. Had the Court applied the traditional conflicts method, it
would have first had to enunciate a general choice of law rule for
determining authorship status and rights ownership before holding
that local contrary rules outweighed application of the designated
foreign law. Clear statement of the normal choice of law rule would
have afforded needed guidance, for lower French courts have elaborated different conflicts rules. While the prevailing trend recognizes
the country of origin's rules on authorship status and copyright own2
ership,8 1 a minority position designates the law of the forum. Ad29. Not all commentators believe that the Huston decision establishes that the French law
definition of authorship is a "loi de police." See Paul Geller, French High Court Remands Huston Colorization Case, ENr. L. REp., Aug. 1991, at 3,4. But see Frangon, Note, supra note 1
(High Court has "categorized the cited texts as lois de police"; in so doing, the Court "probably believed that it would reinforce moral rights to assert, as a first principle, their primacy.
Partisans of protection of creators will rejoice in such a firm attitude [of the Court]."
30. Berne Convention, art. 14 bis(2), supra text accompanying note 8.
31. See, e.g., Judgment of Apr. 29, 1970, Cass. civ. Ire, 1971 R.C.D.I.P. 270, 271 note H.
note J. GinsBatiffol; Judgment of Mar. 14, 1991, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1991 J.C.P. II burg (forthcoming); Judgment of Sept. 21, 1983, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 120 R.I.D.A. 156
(1984); Judgment of Feb. 14, 1977, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 97 R.ID.A. 179 (1978)..
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mittedly, application of the Berne Convention conflicts rule would
not have resolved the broader choice of law question, for the Berne
rule concerns only cinematographic works."3 Nonetheless, resort to
the "loi de police" technique for application of French rules of authorship in Huston may promote further confusion, for the domain of
the "imperative" application of the French definition of authorship
remains uncertain.
B.

SCOPE OF THE COURT'S CONFLICTS RULING

1. Works Affected
Although the Huston case concerned invocation of authorship status and moral rights in an audiovisual work, the High Court's designation of French law to govern authorship status applies to the full
spectrum of works of authorship. The breadth of the decision becomes clear from the Court's treatment of the texts upon which it
based its ruling. To demonstrate this point, it is necessary to explain
some features of French decision-writing and decision-reading.
The style of a French High Court opinion is very different from its
U.S. counterpart. The discussion that characterizes the opinions of
the U.S. Supreme Court is almost entirely absent. Cour de cassation
decisions, including the most important, rarely exceed one or two
pages in length. A decision of reversal will cite the legal texts that the
lower court will be held either to have misapplied or to have violated.
Next, it will state the principle for which these texts stand or the
rules that the texts enunciate. It will then - usually in a single paragraph - set forth the facts and the lower court's reasoning in a manner demonstrating the error of the decision below. The key to understanding the decision is generally the Court's statement of the
meaning of the cited texts. The Court is not quoting the rule verbatim but is paraphrasing it, often in a way that tends to reshape it.
Indeed, the Court may be offering a radically new interpretation of
the rule, all under the guise of citation."' In Huston, the Court's selec32.

See, e.g., Judgment of June 13, 1985, Cour d'appel, Paris, summarized in 2 REVUE DU
INDUSTRIELLE [R.D.P.I.] 116 (1986); RAYNARD, supra note 26, 11 528-

DROIT DE LA PROPRIt)T

39.
33. See Berne Convention, art. 14bis(2).
34. See, e.g., judgment of Mar. 29, 1991, Cass. ass. plan., 1991 J.C.P. II 21673, concl.
D.H. Dontenwille, note J. Ghestin (describing Civil Code art. 1384, cl. 1 as setting forth a
general principle of tort liability for the actions of persons for whom one is responsible; although this interpretation appears to be faithful to the text of art. 1384, it seems less so when
art. 1384 is read in context with the two subsequent articles; moreover, the decision is di-
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tion of the texts to cite was as telling as its description of their contents. On the one hand, the Court cited a French law that in fact did
not apply to the Huston context. On the other hand, the Court did
not cite an article of the Berne Convention that appears to have been
entirely on point.
The referenced French law, the 1964 statute on reciprocity, concerns the extent of protection France will grant to works originating
in countries that do not protect French works. The statute denies
protection of economic rights when the country of origin is not a
member of a copyright treaty to which France is also a signatory, and
when that country fails to provide adequate and effective protection
to French works. Nonetheless, this law preserves protection for rights
of attribution and integrity in such works. Although this law makes
moral rights claims in France available to foreign authors, one must
recognize that the foreign authors at issue come from countries lacking copyright relations with France. That is not the case of the
United States, which, together with France, participates in the Berne
5
and Universal Copyright Conventions. Thus, by its own terms, the
1964 law does not apply to U.S. works.
By contrast, the applicable text should have been Article 14bis(2)
of the Berne Convention. This provision sets forth a conflicts rule for
designating the ownership of author's rights in cinematographic
works: the law of the country where protection is sought. Thus, in
the Huston case, application of Article 14bis(2) would have led to the
same choice of law (French law) as applied by the Cour de cassation
through its method of immediate application of forum rules. Why
then would the Court have failed to rely on the Berne Convention
and instead have invoked a statute whose terms were inapposite?
The scope of the Berne Convention's choice of law rule may supply
the answer. Article 14bis(2) applies only to cinematographic works.
Moreover, the Convention does not set forth a choice of law rule for
determining authorship in works generally. Thus, had the Court relied on the Berne Convention, its holding would have been limited to
cinematographic works. By not citing the Berne Convention, the
Court indicated its disposition to render a decision extending beyond
the particular kind of work of authorship involved in the Huston controversy, to works of authorship of all kinds, at least as far as the
moral rights of attribution and integrity are concerned. By the same
token, the citation of the facially inapposite 1964 law can be underrectly contrary to prior High Court interpretations of this text).
35. Universal Copyright Convention (Paris, July 10, 1974).
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stood as interpreting the law beyond its context to derive a principle
of general application. Implicit in the citation is a kind of a fortiori
reasoning: if France protects moral rights in foreign works even
when it denies protection to economic rights, surely it would also
protect moral rights in foreign works when it grants protection to
economic rights.
2.

Rights Affected

The Huston case concerned standing to invoke the moral right of
integrity, a question that turned on identification of the "author" of
the work, for French law accords the right of integrity only to authors. The Court's ruling that French substantive law would define
who is the "author" of a foreign work implicates another moral right
as well, the right of attribution. This right is covered by the Huston
decision because the statutes cited by the Court address integrity and
attribution rights in tandem. Article 6 of the 1957 Copyright Act
provides that the author enjoys the right to respect for "his name, his
quality, and for his work," and declares these rights "inalienable;"
the 1964 law on reciprocity guarantees attribution and integrity
rights in France to all authors, regardless of their country of origin.
The structure and logic of the High Court's decision therefore apply
equally to the attribution right.3
The Court's application of the French definition of authorship may
also affect entitlement to invoke economic as well as moral rights.
This concern arises from the Court's apparent resort to a constant French - concept of the identity of an "author," whatever the
work's country of origin. Assessing the impact of the Court's decision
requires inquiry into the content of that concept. It bears emphasis
that the "author" a lafrancaise is the human being who created the
work; it is neither a corporate entity, nor the person's employer, nor
the commissioning party." The physicality of the French concept of
authorship prompts the suggestion that the Huston decision could call
into question the recognition by French courts of claims to authorship status advanced by U.S. employers for hire. The validity of the
36. The texts cited by the High Court in Huston addressed only the rights of attribution
and integrity; there is no basis in that decision, then, for finding the right of "repentance or
withdrawal" of "imperative application" to all those whom French law would consider "authors," whatever the work's country of origin. See infra note 63.
37. See Judgment of July 3, 1990, Cass. civ. Ire, 1991 R.T.D. CoM. 44, 48 obs. A. Francon
(French law restricts authorship status to physical persons). See also Jane C. Ginsburg, French
Copyright Law: A Comparative Overview, 36 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'v 269, 271 (1989) and sources
cited therein.
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suggestion, however, turns on further analysis: What rights of authorship accrue to the physical person French law contemplates?
Under French law, the "author" unites two sets of rights. Article 1
of the French copyright law provides that the "author" enjoys "an
incorporeal property right" that "includes attributes of an intellec88
tual and moral order, as well as attributes of an economic order."
Does this text permit the dismemberment of the concept of "author"
and of "author's rights' so as to designate only the text's moral
rights components as "laws of imperative application" to foreign
claimants? Arguably, the text accords authors moral and economic
rights as an ensemble, for these rights flow together from "the sole
fact of the work's creation. '" 9 Indeed, the High Court quoted this
exact phrase in order to emphasize the identity between the "author" and the work's creator (as opposed to the creator's employer).
On the other hand, one could contend that the French legislature
has already bifurcated authors' rights, by separating integrity and attribution rights from economic rights - and according universal application only to the former - in the 1964 law, also relied upon by
the Cour de cassation. The interpretation of the concept of authorship underlying the Court's decision will determine the decision's
scope, for if one insists on the union of moral and economic rights
within the "author's" person, then the Huston decision could disable
a foreigner from claiming economic rights ownership arising out of
his status in the country0 of origin as the "author" and initial titleholder of the copyright.'
The practical impact, however, of even a broadly defined French
concept of authorship to U.S. employers' for hire claims of economic
rights ownership need not be devastating. For even if a French court
henceforth declines to recognize employers' for hire initial copyright
ownership arising out of authorship status, the court will almost cer-1
tiinly recognize economic rights ownership flowing from contract.'
38. France, Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 1.
39. Id.
40. Clearly with respect to moral rights, and possibly with respect to economic rights, the
Huston decision belies the expectations of U.S. motion picture producers, expressed during
the revision process leading to the 1976 Copyright Act, that merely making the U.S. employer for hire the initial owner rather than the "author" could give rise to foreign exploitation problems, but that these could be resolved by labelling the employer the "author" in the
U.S. statute. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BIL reprinted in Copyright Law Revision:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (Comm. Print 1965).
41. See Judgment of Feb. 1, 1989, Cour d'appel, Paris, 142 R.I.D.A. 301, 307 (1989) note
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Accordingly, in the wake of Huston, U.S. employers for hire might
obtain general assignments of their employees' or commissioned parties' copyright interests.4 Such assignments might seem an absurdity,
if viewed only from a U.S. perspective: why obtain a transfer of
rights from employees who have nothing to transfer? Seen from a
French perspective, however, employees are the principal beneficiaries of copyright, and a writing is necessary to transfer exploitation
rights. 48 If French courts are now to treat the actual creators of foreign works as their "authors," then the court might well deem a U.S.
employer for hire who lacks a contract of transfer a stranger to the
work, and decline to recognize the U.S. employer's or its French licensee's standing to sue for infringement."
II. AUTHORS AND EXPLOITATIONS UNDER MORAL RIGHTS
CONTROL
The most significant questions Huston raises for U.S. creators and
exploiters concern the realm of moral rights. A general contract of
P. Sirinelli; Judgment of Apr. 29, 1970, Cass. civ. Ire, 1970 CLUNET 936, 937 note A.
Frangon.
42. A French court might construe certain employment contracts as a presumptive transfer of economic rights in works created pursuant to employment. See France, Law of Mar. 11,
1957, as amended by Law of July 3, 1985, art. 63-1 (employment contract for creation of
audiovisual work is presumed to effect a transfer of copyright for audiovisual exploitation of
creators' contributions); France, Law of July 3, 1985, art. 14 (presumption of transfer of
rights in work commissioned for advertising), art. 45 (rights in employee-created software
devolve upon employer); cf. European Communities Council Directive of May 14, 1991 on
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 250/91/EEC, art. 2.3 reprinted in 1991 O.J. (L
122) 42 ("Where a computer program is created by an employee in the execution of his
duties or following the instructions given by his employer, the employer exclusively shall be
entitled to exercise all economic rights in the program so created ....
").
43. See France, Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 1, cl. 3 (existence of an employment contract
does not derogate from moral and economic rights which an author enjoys from the sole fact
of creating the work), art. 31 (contracts of exploitation must be in writing).
44. A panel of the Paris Court of Appeals had announced this result even before the
decision in Huston; see Judgment of June 13, 1985, summarized in 2 R.D.P.I. at 116 (1986).
That decision may have seemed aberrational at the time; it appears less so now.
One might inquire whether, to the extent foreign creators would be considered "authors"
for purposes of economic as well as moral rights, they also would enjoy French law's economic protections of authors. For example, Article 35 of the French copyright statute announces a 'general principle of proportional, rather than lump sum, remuneration for exploitation of the author's work. However, Article 36 exempts transfers of rights "to or by a
person or an enterprise established abroad." French commentators have inferred from this
exemption that French copyright law's economic rights protections do not express a public
policy overriding the contrary obligations undertaken by an author pursuant to a contract
legitimately governed by foreign law. See, e.g., Judgment of Feb. 1, 1989, Cour d'appel, Paris,
142 R.I.D.A. 301, 307 (1989) note P. Sirinelli; Judgment of Apr. 29, 1970, Cass. civ. Ire,
1970 CLUNET 936, 937 note A. Franqon.
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transfer will not resolve these questions because the French law explicitly provides for the inalienability of moral rights." In the second
part of this article we will therefore explore more closely who is entitled to claim authorship status .in France, and how U.S. creators'
moral rights may affect the exploitation of their works in France.
A.

WHO

IS

AN "AUTHOR"

UNDER FRENCH LAW?

As discussed above, Huston reiterates that the "author," at least for
purposes of standing to claim certain moral rights, means the actual
physical person who created the work, and excludes not only corporate entities, but any surrogate whose economic investment in the
work's creation might entitle him to authorship status in another
6
copyright system, notably those of Anglo-American orientation.'
However, despite the Court's emphasis on the equivalence between
the "author" of the work and its "creator," the French copyright
statute defines neither of these terms.
Several elements of the statute nonetheless reinforce Huston's conclusion that the "author" must be a physical being. Article 14, concerning authorship of audiovisual works, states that "the quality of
being an author of an audiovisual work belongs to the physical person or persons who realize the intellectual creation of the work." Article 13, governing ownership of collective works and setting forth an
exception to the principle of employee ownership of works, states
that this kind of work is the "property of the physical or juridical
person under whose name the work is made public." Thus, although
a juridical person is entitled to initial rights ownership, the statute
does not label it an "author"; it provides only that the work is the
juridical person's "property." Article 45 of the 1985 amendments to
45. France, Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 6. Concern that a U.S. employee for hire or other
author who executes a waiver of moral rights in a contract governed by U.S. law will subsequently invoke her unwaivable moral rights in France might prompt a U.S. employer for hire
or grantee to seek to circumvent foreign moral rights guarantees by providing in the contract
for a damage action in a U.S. court (or for liquidated damages) in the event of the author's
breach of the waiver. The willingness of a U.S. court to enforce such a clause may depend on
either of two factors: 1) its approach to international comity; or 2) its reading of the waiver
clause. With regard to the first, we expect the U.S. court would defer to the judgment of a
foreign court having jurisdiction over the parties and ruling on the local application of domestic law. With regard to the second, a U.S. court might imply into the waiver clause the
condition that the waiver be effective under the law of the jurisdictions in which the work is
exploited. As a result, the clause would be inapplicable to French exploitation.
46. For example, U.S. copyright law provides that the employer, or under certain enumerated circumstances, the commissioning party, is deemed the "author" of works created
pursuant to the employment or commissioned work contract. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b)
(1978).
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the 1957 Copyright Act provides that "all the rights recognized to
authors" "devolve upon" the employer when software is created pursuant to employment; the statute does not denominate the programmer's employer as the "author."
We next examine the second prong of the Cour de cassation's
equation, that the author is the physical person who "created" the
work. What does it mean to "create" a work in French copyright
law? Article 7 of the 1957 law declares that "the work is deemed
created, independently of any public disclosure of the work, from the
sole fact of the realization, even incomplete, of the author's conception." This text indicates two components to creation: conception
and concretization. Several decisions hold that the simple realization
of another's conception does not constitute authorship; the person
putting the author's ideas into concrete form will not be an author
unless the realization requires the exercise of artistic judgment in the
execution .41
By the same token, simply furnishing an "idea," without conferring a concrete form upon it, does not make one the creator of a
work of authorship. Thus, French courts have held, for example,
that Christo's wrapping of the Pont Neuf constituted a protectible
work because he did not merely set forth the idea of wrapping the
Pont Neuf but carried out the idea in a particular manner."8 By contrast, the unrealized project of wrapping the trees on the Champs
Elys6es did not amount to a work of authorship because, absent the
concretization of the concept, the project was merely an "idea."'" On
the other hand, in French copyright law, as in U.S. copyright law, the
contribution of elaborated ideas may make one a co-author of a collaborative work." Of course, as in U.S. copyright law, the distinction
47. See, e.g., Judgment of May 31, 1976, Cour d'appel, Limoges, 90 R.I.DA. 173 (1976)
(rejecting claim to co-authorship status of weaver of tapestry executed from artist's cartoons);
Judgment of July 6, 1976, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 90 R.I.D.A. 190 (1976) (author of a photograph held to be the person who prepares the composition of the shot, not the person who
simply depresses the camera's shutter). See also Judgment of Mar. 29, 1989, Cass. civ. Ire,
141 R.I.D.A. 262 (1989) (affirming decision of appellate court that the director of television
program was not a co-author of the work because his contribution was purely technical).
48. Judgment of Mar. 13, 1986, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1987 DALLOZ SOMMAIRES COMMENT S
[D. SOMM. COMM.] 150 obs. C. Colombet.
49. Judgment of May 26, 1987, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 1988 D. SOMM. COMM. 201 obs. C.
Colombet. Cf Judgment of Nov. 13, 1973, Cass. civ. Ire, 1974 D.S. Jur. 533, 534 note C.
Colombet; 1975 J.C.P. 11 18029 note M.C. Manigne (upholding co-authorship status of artist
who created sculptures from Renoir's drawings under Renoir's supervision. Renoir's own status as an author of the sculptures was not challenged, although it appears that Renoir contributed no physical effort to their creation).
50. Compare Judgment of Dec. 18, 1978, Cass. civ. Ire, 1980 D.S. Jur. 49 note C.
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in French law between providing unprotected "ideas" and supplying
a protectable collection of ideas amounting to authorship can be
elusive1
The French law approach to authorship includes some special rules
pertinent to two categories of works that are the subject matter of
many U.S. works for hire: audiovisual works on the one hand, and
"collective works" on the other. Whereas in the United States, employee-for-hire contributors to these works are not considered authors, in France they retain authorship status. Huston therefore raises
the possibility that U.S. contributors to these kinds of works may enjoy standing in France as authors.
For audiovisual works, the statute lists certain contributors who are
presumptively entitled to co-authorship status. These are the authors
of the audiovisual work's scenario, adaptation, dialogue, musical
soundtrack (when the music is created for the film) and the director. 2 This presumption does not preclude other contributors, for example, cinematographers or set designers, from proving their entitlement to co-authorship status. The work itself may supply the
requisite indicia of authorship; for example, if a film's credits and
advertising list a contributor as an author, a court may accept that
characterization, even if the contributor is not the principal screenwriter.5 8 Absent such convenient proof, however, a claimant to auColombet (set designer deemed a co-author when he not only supplied ideas, but sketches
elaborating his ideas as well) with Fisher v. Klein, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1795 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Leval,
J.) ("significant participation" in work's creation through suggestions and discussions, combined with parties' intent to collaborate on work, gives rise to co-authorship, even though
one "author" did not physically realize the work). See generally CLAUDE COLOMBET, PROPRICTi
LrrrRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 27 & n.5 (5th ed. 1990).
51. On the difficulty of distinguishing unprotectable "ideas" from protected "form," see
generally IVAN CHERPILLOD,, L'OBJET DU DROIT D'AUTEUR (1985) (comparative law: French,
German, Swiss, U.S.); ANDRE LUCAS, LA PROTECTION DES CREATIONS INDUSTRIELLES ABSTRAITES
93-117, 163-72 (1975).
52. France, Law of Mar. 11, 1957, as amended by Law of July 3, 1985, art. 14.2. This
presumption has applied to all audiovisual works since 1986. The prior version of the presumption, contained in the 1957 law, addressed only "cinematographic works." In French
law, a "cinematographic work" is generally considered to mean an audiovisual work created
for exhibition in cinemas; it does not include audiovisual works created for television. See
Judgment of May 31, 1988, Cour d'appel, Paris, 139 R.I.D.A. 183 (1989); 1990 D.S. Jur. 235
note B. Edelman. See also Charles Debbasch, A propos de la distinction entre les films et les
oeuvres audiovisuelles, 1991 Dalloz-Sirey, Chronique [D. Chr.] 179. As a result, the contributors
to a pre-1986 made-for-TV work, as well as the contributors to all pre-March 1957 audiovisual works, must prove their authorship status. See, e.g., Judgment of Mar. 29, 1989, Cass. civ.
Ire, 141 R.I.D.A. 262 (1989).
53. See, e.g., Judgment of May 24, 1989, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 143 R.I.D.A. 353 (1990)
(associate scriptwriter did not benefit from statutory presumption of authorship status, but
film's credits entitled him to be considered a co-author of the film).
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thorship status needs to show that her work manifested her personal
intellectual creation, rather than purely technical contributions made
under the director's orders.0"
The statute also declares that "when the audiovisual work is based
on a preexisting work or script that is still protected [by copyright],
the authors of the original [underlying] work are assimilated to the
authors of the new work."58 This provision is distinct from the other
attributions of authorship, for it creates a legal fiction of authorship
on behalf of the author of the underlying work. This person need
not have in fact participated in the elaboration of the audiovisual
work in order to be denominated a co-author. Nonetheless, the author of the underlying work enjoys the economic and moral rights
benefits of a co-author of the film. One might therefore inquire
whether this fictional assimilation of authorship applies to authors of
works from which foreign audiovisual works are derived. An affirmative answer could mean, for example, that not only John Huston's
heirs, but also Dashiell Hammett's heirs would have standing to object to the French broadcast of a colorized version of The Maltese
Falcon.
We conclude, however, that the High Court's decision in Huston
does not support assimilating authors of underlying works to the status of co-authors of the resulting non-French audiovisual work. The
Cour de cassation in Huston stressed the entitlement to moral rights
flowing to all authors, French or foreign, "from the sole fact of the
work's creation." A corollary to this principle may be that moral
rights flow solely from the fact of the work's creation. 6 Because the
author of the underlying work did not participate in the creation of
the audiovisual work, we would argue that the statutory assimilation
of underlying authors to the status of co-authors of audiovisual works
is not of "imperative application" to foreign audiovisual works. As a
result, this particular French law characterization of authorship
should not apply. 7
54. See generally COLOMBET, supra note 50, at 124-25, and decisions cited at nn.1-2.
55. France, Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 14.3.
56. Article I of the 1957 law bases the author's rights "du seul fait de la creation"; we
imply "et seulement du fait de la creation."
57. By contrast, if a French film were based on a U.S. novel (e.g., Truffaut's The Bride
Wore Black was based on a short story by William Irish (a.k.a. Cornell Woolrick who also
authored the story upon which the film Rear Window was based). See Abend v. Stewart, 110
S.Ct. 1750 (1990)). French law should apply to assimilate the U.S. novelist to a co-author of
the film. This is not an extraterritorial assertion of French law, since in this instance the
audiovisual work is itself French. Moreover, nothing in Article 14 governing French audiovisual works limits the assimilation of co-authorship to French nationals. As a result, the U.S.
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Collective works form a second category of U.S. works for hire
whose individual creators may now enjoy authorship status in France.
As in U.S. law, collective works include newspapers, periodicals and
encyclopedias."' The French statute makes the physicial or juridical
person who coordinates the creation and assemblage of the work the
"owner" and "invests" him with the copyright in the work in its entirety.5 9 However, each physical person who contributed to the work
preserves her authorship status with respect to her individual contributions. As a result, she may claim attribution of authorship if her
contributions can be individually identified. 0a Moreover, the High
Court has ruled that she may invoke her right of integrity against the
6" although that
coordinator's modifications of her contributions,
tolerated in the intercourt has also held that some alterations will be
62
ensemble.
an
as
work
the
harmonizing
est of
B.

EXPLOITATIONS SUBJECT TO THE MORAL RIGHT OF INTEGRITY

With respect to employee-created works generally, under Huston
any contributor to a work exploited in France who is considered an
author of the underlying work should share in the profits of the exploitation of the audiovisual work (as well as receiving compensation for granting the derivative work's right in the
novel to create the audiovisual work).
58. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1978) (defining "collective work" and "work made for
hire") with France, Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 9.3 (defining "oeuvre collective"). For a discussion of examples of works deemed "collective" in French law, see COLOMBET, supra note 50,
at 119.
59. France, Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 13.
60. See Judgment of May 20, 1988, Cour d'appel, Versailles, 1989 D. SOMM. CoMM. 44 obs.
C. Colombet (photographer has the right to credit for his photographs in catalogue).
61. Judgment of Oct. 9, 1980, Cass. civ. Ire, 108 R.I.D.A. 156 (1981) (reversing appellate
court for failure to determine if alterations made to contributions to encyclopedia of business
law were necessary to collective enterprise of editing encyclopedia); Judgment of May 17,
1984, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 122 R.I.D.A. 214 (1984) (cuts and rewrites of contributions to
musical encyclopedia held to violate contributor's right of integrity).
62. Judgment of Dec. 16, 1986, Cass. civ. Ire, 133 R.I.D.A. 183 (1987) (editor of legal
encyclopedia's effort to "fuse the various contributions into an ensemble" held not to violate
contributors' moral rights).
Authors of contributions to newspapers and magazines also retain economic rights in their
individual contributions. They may exploit these contributions separately, so long as they do
not compete with exploitation of the collective work. France, Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art.
36.3.
Art. 36.4 further provides that "only the author has the right to gather his articles and
speeches in a collection and to publish them or to authorize their publication in this form."
Arguably this provision could apply to the French publication of articles and speeches by
foreign employees for hire; however, Article 36 as a whole concerns economic rights. Although the right at issue here evokes the moral right of "divulgation," its placement in the
statute makes it more likely to be considered more economic than moral in nature, and,
under our analysis, might not apply "imperatively" to foreign creators.
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"author" under French law is entitled to recognition of her authorship status (moral right of attribution) and to ensure the integrity of
her work.68 We will now address certain kinds of exploitations of
U.S. works in France that may implicate the creator's moral right of
integrity. Our examination will focus especially on the French exploitation of audiovisual works.
In French law, the moral right of integrity varies in intensity according to the nature of the exploitation of the work. An exploitation of the work itself, as opposed to its adaptation, requires absolute
fidelity.64 Unauthorized modifications of the work convey a false impression of the work and thus misrepresent the authorial personality
within the work.65 By contrast, when the creator has authorized an
adaptation, she can no longer contend that any departure from the
underlying work denatures her creation." There are, however, at
least two classes of adaptations that will be held to violate the author's underlying right of integrity. First, incompetent adaptations:
an inept adaptation will be held to violate the underlying author's
moral rights. 67 Second, unanticipated adaptations: even with a broad
and general right to create derivative works, certain kinds of derivative exploitations, particularly those unknown at the time of contracting, may not only have been uncontemplated by the author, but,
if contemplated, would have been excluded because they would have
violated the work's integrity."
63. The special copyright regime for software set forth at Article 45 to the 1985 amendments of the French copyright act transfers to the employers of programmers "all rights
recognized to authors." However, the programmer is still considered the "author" of the
software, for Article 46 sets forth the moral rights that the "author" may not claim. These
are the rights of integrity and of "repentance or withdrawal," that is, the right of the author
to withdraw from circulation a work she considers unworthy. See France, Law of Mar. 11,
1957, art. 32. Article 46 thus preserves to programmers the moral right of attribution of
their authorship status. Moreover, the right of integrity is disqualified only with respect to
authorized adaptations.
64. See France, Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 6 (general principle of right of integrity), art
16.3 (no addition, deletion or change may be made in the final version of an audiovisual work
without the agreement of the co-authors), art 47 (the person undertaking the public performance of a work must assure that the conditions under which the work is performed will respect the work's integrity).
65. See COLOMBET, supra note 50.
66. See generally Pierre Sirinelli, Le droit moral de l'auteur et le droit commun des contrats 278-89 (1985) (thesis, University of Paris).
67. See, e.g., Judgment of Apr. 18, 1979, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 102 RID.A. 175 (1979).
68. Cf. Sirinelli, supra note 66, at 280 & n.3 (duty of respect is open-ended to allow for
accommodation of unanticipated kinds of exploitations).
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1. Exploitations of the Work Itself: Audiovisual Works
French texts and case law furnish several pertinent examples of the
exploiter's obligations of fidelity in the domain of audiovisual works.
One instance of current concern is commercial interruptions of televised programs. Until 1986, commercials appeared only before and
after programs, not during them. Since 1986, a telecommunications
statute has allowed the commercial interruption of broadcast audiovisual works, but only on privately-owned television stations; it permits
only one interruption per work, subject to the author's agreement."9
A French court has held that insertion of commercials without the
director's agreement violated his right of integrity."0 Under Huston,
it appears that a French licensee of a U.S. film would be obliged to
secure the agreement of the film's director and screenwriter (and
other creators that French law designates as "authors" of an audiovisual work 7') before the film may be broadcast with an interruption
for advertisements. French courts have also held that the superimposition of the television station's logo on a broadcast film violated the
work's integrity,72 as did the insertion into a broadcast documentary's
credits of a notice warning viewers that they might find the documentary's point of view dated. 3
2.

Adaptations and Moral Rights

When the author has granted rights to adapt her work to another
medium, the adaptor's duty of fidelity is necessarily attenuated. The
adaptor must enjoy sufficient leeway to create her own original work
of authorship in the new medium; nonetheless, French courts have
held that she must respect the substance, character and spirit of the
underlying work. 7 ' Determining whether the latter has occurred nec69. France, Law of Sept. 30, 1986, art. 73, as modified by Law of Jan. 17, 1989. See 1989
R.T.D. Com. 236 obs. A. Franqon.
70. Judgment of May 24, 1989, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 143 R.I.D.A. 353 (1990).
71. See France, Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 14.2; supra part II.A.
72. Judgment of Oct. 25, 1989, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1990 D. SOMM. Comm. 54 obs. C.
Colombet.
73. Judgment of Apr. 4, 1991, Cass. civ. Ire, 1991 IMAGES JURIDIQUES, No. 85. For a
fuller discussion of recent French court decisions addressing the right of integrity in audiovisual works, see Frederic Pollaud-Dulian, Moral Rights in France Through Recent Case Law, 145
R.I.D.A. 126, 192-200 (1990).
74. See, e.g., Judgment of Nov. 22, 1966, Cass. civ. Ire, 1967 D.S. Jur. 485 note H.
Desbois at 488 (adaptation of literary work to film requires "recognizing a certain liberty to
the cinematographic adaptor, whose role consists of finding, without denaturing the character of the work, a new expression of the substance of the underlying work" (quoting Judgment of May 13, 1964, Cass. civ. Ire)). See generally HENRI DEsBois, LE DROIT D'AUTEUR EN
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essarily demands case-by-case evaluation. It will often require courts
to make artistic judgments to some extent because the author of the
underlying work is in essence charging that the derivative work was
ineptly produced.
A different kind of problem, one of particular pertinence to U.S.
creators, is posed when the first author alleges that the very nature
of the adaptation violates the character and substance of the underlying work. This, in essence, is the moral rights claim pressed by the
Huston plaintiffs: John Huston chose to film his works in black and
white, and he designed their "look" for the black and white medium.
Accordingly, colorization deprives them of an essential quality and
fundamentally alters their character. In this instance, it does not matter whether the adaptation was competently or poorly accomplished.
The point is that, even if the adaptor was granted derivative work
rights, and even if his work is well made, he could not make this kind
of derivative work without violating the underlying work's right of
integrity.
Analysis of how French courts would rule on this kind of integrity
rights claim requires discussion of the extent to which, despite the
ostensible "inalienability" of moral rights, French courts will in fact
tolerate express or implicit waivers of such claims. In theory, the statutorily-declared "inalienable" character of these rights is understood
to bar any transactions in moral rights." Nonetheless, in practice, a
court's response might differ if, on the one hand, the underlying
work's author explicitly granted the right to make the kind of adaptation at issue, or, on the other hand, she granted a general right of
adaptation but did not expressly envision the complained-of adaptation. In the first case, a court might determine that the author's
grant of the specific adaptation right constituted the author's recognition that that kind of adaptation would not per se violate the underlying work's integrity. At that point, the issue might well reduce
to whether the licensed adaptation was competently made.
In the latter case, a claim of per se violation of the right of integrity would likely fare better, particularly if the kind of adaptation at
issue not only received no mention in the contract, but was unknown
638-39 (3d ed. 1978).
75. See, e.g., DasBots, supra note 74, 382 (author's renunciation of right to defend his
"personality" as manifested in his works would amount to "moral suicide"); Andre Frangon,
La liberti contractuelle dans le domaine du droit d'auteur en France, 1976 D. Chr. 55. But see
Bernard Parisot, L'inaliknabilitidu droit moral, 1972 D. Chr. 71, 75. Cf M.J. Radin, MarketInalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (considering rights that, in U.S. law, are, or
should be, out of commerce).
FRANCE IM
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or unforeseen at the time of contracting.7 ' In the domain of economic rights, the French copyright statute mandates a restrictive interpretation of grants of future rights." Presumably, a French court
would also interpret restrictively broad grants of future exploitation
rights that, if read expansively, would impinge on moral rights. If the
court held, as a matter of economic rights, that the adaptation right
at issue had not been transferred, the court would not be required to
rule on the existence or enforceability of a moral rights waiver. If the
court found a broad grant of economic rights, the court could still
determine that the parties anticipated the author's continuing moral
rights prerogotives. 7 " Again, the question of waiver could be
79
avoided.
Suppose, however, the derivative works contract not only expressly
covered new and unknown modes of adaptation but expressly waived
any moral rights claims to which these potential adaptations could
give rise. The underlying work's author could no longer allege lack
of intent to authorize the adaptation at issue, and the waiver issue
would be precisely posed. Despite the principle of inalienability of
moral rights, it is unclear how a French court would rule in this situation, for the case law is neither abundant nor consistent.80 Some firstlevel courts have declared that any explicit waiver is a nullity.8 1 On
the other hand, the Paris Court of Appeals has sustained a contract
in which a novelist granted total freedom to the producer of a film
adaptation.82 The court held that the clause of the contract authoriz76. Cf. France, Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 30.4 ("[Wlhen a contract includes a total grant
of one of the two rights set out in the present article [right of reproduction and right of
public performance], the scope of the grant is limited to modes of exploitation set forth in
the contract.").
77. For example, Article 38 provides: "The clause of a grant which tends to confer the
right to exploit a work under a form not foreseeable or not foreseen at the date of the contract must be express and must stipulate a correlative participation in the profits of the
exploitation."
78. See, e.g., Judgment of Dec. 1, 1983, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 120 R.I.D.A. 162, 165 (1984)
(implying moral rights reservation in contract between authors of comic strip and publisher,
and stating that had the contract purported to waive moral rights, the waiver would have
been void).
79. On French courts' sometimes strained interpretations of contracts to avoid finding
waivers of moral rights, see, e.g., Andr6 Franqon & Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors' Rights In
France: The Moral Right of the Creator of a Commissioned Work To Compel the CommissioningParty
To Complete the Work, 9 CoLuM.-VLA ART & L. 381, 393-94 (1985).
80. For a fuller discussion of French courts' treatment of clauses renouncing moral rights
objections to adaptations, see Sirinelli, supra note 66, at 296-307. See also works cited infra
note 83.
81. See, e.g., Judgment of Dec. 1, 1983, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 120 R.ID.A. 162 (1984);
Judgment of May 27, 1959, Trib. gr. inst., Seine, 24 R.I.D.A. 145 (1959).
82. Judgment of Nov. 23, 1970, Cour d'appel, Paris, 69 R.I.D.A. 74 (1971).
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ing the writer to insert in the film credits a notice of his disapproval
of the film adaptation adequately secured his interest in preserving
the integrity of the underlying work. 3
Grantees of derivative works rights, however, should not rely heavily on this decision to bolster their claims to enforce a waiver of
moral rights regarding new or unforseen modes of adaptation, even
were the waiver clause accompanied by a clause permitting the author to warn the public of her displeasure with the adaptation. The
Paris Court of Appeals decision did not concern novel or unanticipated forms of exploitation. Rather, it was a conventional book-tofilm moral rights controversy, in which the novelist deplored the
quality of the adaptation, for he asserted that the film lent an inappropriately comic aspect to the principal character of his novels.
Moreover, the Paris Court of Appeals decision indicates that the true
purpose of the novelist's suit was not to protect the integrity of his
protagonist but to negotiate a better percentage of the film's profits.' In other words, the author appears to have been pressing a pecuniary rights claim in a moral rights guise. French courts have been
83. A curious decision of the Cour de cassation, first civil chamber, Apr. 7, 1987, 134
R.I.D.A. 197 (1987), holds that, prior to creating a work, the author of a commissioned work
may agree to "limit his liberty of creation," and thus be constrained to submit his work for
the commissioning party's approval. Although the result may be justified by the facts of the
case, the Court's reasoning has provoked uniform criticism, for the Court stated that moral
rights in a work do not exist prior to the work's creation, and that an author's agreement,
prior to creation, to "obey the imperatives of a commission" therefore does not constitute a
forbidden waiver of moral rights. Commentators have stressed that moral rights are personal
to the author; they precede creation of the work. Pre-creation agreements to accept the commissioning party's modifications thus do constitute waivers. See, e.g., 1988 R.T.D. CoM. 224
obs. A. Frangon; Emmanuel Derieux, Commissioned Work, Creative Freedom and the Author's
Moral Right, 141 R.I.D.A. 198 (1989); Andr6 Franqon, La jurisprudencefranfaise ricente et le
droit moral, in MLANGES Offerts A Joseph Voyame 109, 110-12 (1989); Pollaud-Dulian, supra
note 73, at 132-40.
As one commentator has pointed out, however, see Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 73, one
should distinguish an agreement to "limit freedom of creation" from an agreement to tolerate violations of a work's integrity. Moral rights principles are not compromised if a commissioned author agrees, for example, to adhere to a budget, even if cost constraints may well
restrict her artistic freedom. The Cour de cassation may simply have employed an overbroad
formula to state an uncontroversial proposition. In any event, the Court's reasoning would
not seem to extend to validating a pre-creation agreement to accept subsequent adaptations
of the work. This agreement would constitute a waiver even under the Court's reasoning,
because it would apply not to the commissioned work itself, but to works thereafter derived
from it.
84. See Judgment of July 23, 1970, Cour d'appel, Paris, 69 R.I.D.A. at 75 (1971) (plaintiff
initially brought breach of contract claim; first-level court raised moral rights issue sua
sponte). See generally Sirinelli, supra note 66, at 305-07.
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vigilant to prevent the misuse of moral rights to promote economic
goals. 85
A recent decision of the Cour de cassation reiterates the special,
non-pecuniary character of moral rights claims."' The High Court
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of an author's claim under the
moral right of withdrawal. 87 The author had sought to exercise this
right because he deemed the royalty paid by the publisher inadequate. The Court held that the moral right of withdrawal could not
serve as a means to an economic end.
In this case, plaintiff (perhaps badly counseled) acknowledged the
motivation for his claim; the courts thus had little difficulty declaring
its impropriety. As a general matter, an author need not justify her
motivation for invoking moral rights.8" Nonetheless, the exploiter
may raise, and bears the burden of proving, improper motivation as a
defense. One may anticipate that French courts will henceforth hear
and carefully scrutinize this defense. 89
85. See, e.g., Judgment of Feb. 6, 1986, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1988 CLUNET 1021 note B.
Edelman (discussed in Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 96-98 (invocation of right of attribution as
means to pressure co-contractant into renegotiating compensation for merchandizing
properties)).
This kind of misuse of moral rights, which the French would refer to as a "dtournement
de la finalit6 du droit," should be distinguished from "abuse of right" ("abus de droit"). The
latter may be held to exist when the rights-claimant invokes the right in order to harm the
other party. The Cour de cassation and some commentators have stated that moral rights are
not subject to the defense of "abuse of right." See Judgment of June 5, 1984, Cass. civ. Ire,
124 R.I.D.A. 150 (1985); DEsBois, supra note 74,1 396; Pollaud-Dulian, supra note 73, at 146-

48. But
86.
-

see COLOMBET,

supra note 50,

133.

Judgment of May 14, 1991, Chiavarinov. SPE, Cass. civ. Ire, forthcoming 150 R.I.D.A.
(1991).

87. See supra note 63.
88. Cf Judgment of Feb. 28, 1989, Cass. civ. Ire, 141 R.I.D.A. 257, 259 (1989) note A.
Fran(on (reversing lower court's finding of widow's "notorious abuse" of exploitation rights
of works of late artist Fujita; Mine. Fujita refused to license plaintiffs to reproduce Fujita's
works in their biography; while the lower courts indicated suspicion of Mine. Fujita's motives
for refusing, the High Court accepted Mine. Fujita's assertions at face value; Prof. Franqon's
note accompanying the decision suggests the High Court gave Mine. Fujita more credit than
she deserved).
89. One may also anticipate that French courts will sense considerable pressure to scrutinize carefully foreign contributors' moral rights claims, lest they become, as one French commentator has predicted, "blackmail against American [film] producers." See Andr6 Bertrand,
Affaire "John Huston": la Cour de cassationopte pour "la loi de la jungle", 38 CAHIERS DU DROIT
D'AUTEUR 1, 9 (1991). Bertrand also suggests that the U.S. producers might have recourse to
the International Court of Justice in the Hague, or to the European Court of Human Rights
in Strasbourg, "in order to obtain a very severe condemnation of France for violation of the
producer's property right." Id.
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CONCLUSION

The French Supreme Court's decision in Huston will significantly
affect many foreign creators and exploiters of works of authorship.
Under Huston, any contributor to a work exploited in France who is
considered an "author" under French law is entitled to be recognized as the work's author and to ensure the integrity of the work.
The breadth of the Huston decision raises the question whether
French law also determines initial ownership of economic rights. Although at least one reading of the decision and the cited statutory
texts supports an expansive view of the decision's scope, the more
likely construction of the decision would limit its mandatory application of French law concepts of authorship to the moral rights of attribution and integrity.
An "author's" ability to invoke moral rights under Huston applies
to the full range of works of authorship, not merely audiovisual
works. With respect to audiovisual works, however, Huston has special
implications. Most foreign contributors who, under French law,
would enjoy the statutory presumption of authorship of audiovisual
works, 90 as well as those contributors who prove their authorship, are
entitled to protect their work against unauthorized modifications, including alterations, deletions, interruptions and insertion of
commercials.
Finally Huston might well be read together with the High Court's
contemporaneous decision regarding the moral right of withdrawal.
The latter's emphasis on the peculiar importance of the "moral"
character of moral rights may limit Huston's potential impact. As a
pair, the decisions indicate that French courts will entertain integrity
and attribution rights claims from any person French law would
deem the "author," no matter what that person's status in the work's
country of origin; however, the courts will also examine closely the
moral rights claim to ensure that the creator is in fact seeking to secure authorship attribution and/or to preserve the integrity of her
work, rather than to renegotiate improved compensation.

90.

Albeit not authors of underlying literary works.
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Appendix
Decision of the Cour de cassation, first civil chamber, May 28, 1991:

Mme. Huston and others v. Sociti d'exploitation de la cinqui~me chaine
and others
Citing clause 2 of article 1 of law No. 64-689 of July 8, 1964 [the
law concerning international reciprocity in copyright protection], together with article 6 of the law of March 11, 1957 [the copyright
law];
Whereas, according to the first of these texts, in France, no violation may be made of the integrity of a literary or artistic work,
whatever the territory on which the work was first disclosed; whereas
the person who is the author of the work from the sole fact of the
work's creation is invested with moral rights which are established
for his benefit by the second of the texts cited above; whereas these
rules are laws of imperative application;
Whereas the Huston plaintiffs are the heirs of John Huston, the codirector of the film "Asphalt Jungle," created in black and white, but
of which the Turner Company, grantee of the producer, established
a colored version; whereas, invoking their right to compel the respect
of the integrity of John Huston's work, the Huston plaintiffs, joined
by various entities [authors' rights societies], have requested the
judges below to prohibit the television station "La Cinq" from broadcasting this new version; whereas the Court of Appeals dismissed
their claim on the ground that the elements of fact and law found by
the appellate court "prohibited the eviction of the American [copyright] law and the setting aside of the contracts" that had been concluded between the producer and the directors, contracts that denied
the latter persons the status of authors of the film "Asphalt Jungle";
Whereas in so holding, the Court of Appeals has violated the
above-cited texts by refusal to apply them;
For these reasons, and without need to hold on the other objections raised in the petition for this Court's review:
Reverse and annul, in all respects, the decision rendered by the
Court of Appeals of Paris, July 6, 1989, reinstate therefore the case
and the parties in the state in which they were before said decision
and, for resolution of the case, send the parties before the Court of
Appeals of Versailles.

